



The President's Daily Brief

~~Top Secret~~ 25 January 1968



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
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DAILY BRIEF
25 JANUARY 1968

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
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2. South Vietnam

Some members of the lower House
may be planning to dabble in peace ef-
forts.

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3. Laos

Over a week after the debacle at
Nam Bac, the government still cannot ac-
count for more than half of the troops
deployed there. Large stocks of heavy
weapons, ammunition, and other equip-
ment were also lost. We do not believe
that the Communists intend to drive far
south from Nam Bac, but they are step-
ping up their annual dry-season campaign
against government guerrilla bases in
the northeast.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam



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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
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I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

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Kosygin to Hanoi?: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Premier Kosygin will go on to Hanoi after his visit to New Delhi later this week. Such a visit could be timed to coincide with the Tet bombing pause. The last high-level Soviet visit to Hanoi was in January 1966, when Politburo member Shelepin led a delegation to North Vietnam during the 37-day pause. The current US-Korean trouble could alter any plans Kosygin might have.

* * *

Hanoi Holds the Line: North Vietnam seems unwilling to go any further in publicly elaborating on its position concerning talks with the US. After strongly denouncing President Johnson's restatement of the San Antonio formula in his State of the Union message, North Vietnamese media generally have concentrated on presenting Hanoi's usual hard-line treatment of the war and ignored the issue of negotiations.

On 22 January, Mai Van Bo, who last week publicly stressed the positive aspects of Hanoi's position, cancelled a scheduled interview because he had "said everything he had to say up to now."

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Hanoi still has not endorsed Mai Van Bo's off-the-record interview with a French journalist on 17 January. His remarks at that time may have exceeded the bounds of what Hanoi wants said in public,

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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

Nothing of significance to report.

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